Killing the Chicken to Scare the Monkey: Effectiveness of Countercriticism Coercion by China
States often ignore, deny, or contest external criticism of their domestic human rights. In an overlooked form of backlash, economically powerful states such as China sometimes respond to criticism coercively by threatening or sanctioning their critics. This escalation from purely verbal criticism to threats and sanctions is puzzling: countercriticism coercion enacts significant costs, fails to compel targets to withdraw their criticism, and draws attention and gives credence to the original critique of repression. China deploys countercriticism coercion primarily to deter third-party states from criticism, particularly swing states with moderate human rights records that can prevent multilateral criticism at venues such as the UN Human Rights Council.
How effective is China’s countercriticism coercion at deterring third-party states from criticizing China? I theorize that states are more likely to be deterred from criticizing states with a reputation for countercriticism coercion, such as China, than states without such a reputation. Third-party states observe China’s sanctions, assess their applicability to themselves, and reduce their criticism. I theorize that states with higher potential economic gains from China are more likely to be deterred from criticizing China than states with lower potential economic gains or higher current economic dependence on China.
To measure the success of deterrence, I compare third-party states’ criticism after China has developed a reputation for countercriticism coercion to their criticism of two types of baselines: China before a reputation for countercriticism coercion and countries that violate human rights but do not have reputations for countercriticism coercion. I assess the effectiveness of countercriticism coercion in deterring third-party states at three levels: national case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia, regional analysis of the European Union, and regression across UN member states. China’s reputation for countercriticism coercion does deter third-party states from criticism, especially states with higher potential economic gains from China. The continued deployment of countercriticism coercion by states such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could exacerbate the gap in multilateral human rights advocacy aimed at more and less powerful states.
“Countercriticism Coercion: Why States React to Verbal Human Rights Criticism with Sanctions”
Repression of Freedom of Speech in Economically Powerful States, 1989-2022 (Varieties of Democracy)
Reactions to international naming and shaming range from human rights improvements to backlash. One overlooked form of backlash is countercriticism coercion, the threat or imposition of sanctions on external critics that issue human rights criticism. Countercriticism coercion is costly and fails to persuade audiences of the absence of rights violations. Why do states ever escalate from purely verbal criticism to coercion? I theorize that states with greater economic power and restrictions on domestic freedom of speech are more likely to react coercively to criticism. A review of state reactions to Nobel Peace Prizes to human rights activists confirms that economic power is a necessary condition for countercriticism coercion. Among the twenty largest economies, I examine government reactions to criticism in the form of human rights prizes, tweets, parliamentary resolutions, and speeches at the UN. Powerful states that restrict freedom of speech, namely China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India since 2019, were more likely to coerce external critics. The conditions that facilitate countercriticism coercion shed light on why states care about external criticism and establish a foundation for understanding why specific states react coercively to criticism.
Presented at ISA 2023
“Countercriticism Coercion by China: Tacit Sanctions to Deter Third-Party States”
Original Dataset of Human Rights Prize Recipients, 1945-2021
China has increasingly reacted coercively to verbal human rights criticism from abroad, exemplifying how backlash manifests not only as noncompliance, but as countercriticism coercion. China deploys countercriticism coercion primarily to deter third-party states, especially swing states with moderate rights records that can prevent multilateral criticism. In response to human rights prizes since 1945, China sanctioned champion states that were least likely to reverse their criticism and avoided attributing sanctions to criticism or publicizing sanctions domestically. China’s tacitness and selection of targets suggest that China seeks to deter third-party states, rather than attempting to silence direct targets or rally their domestic public. Countercriticism coercion demonstrates how China seeks to undermine the application of human rights norms, while minimizing overt defiance of international norms. This finding indicates how human rights advocacy can backfire, the need to assess the effects of sanctions on multiple audiences, and policy implications for human rights advocates.
Presented at MPSA 2022 and New Faces in Chinese Politics (University of Wisconsin-Madison) 2022
“Countercriticism Coercion by China: Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions on Target States”
“Norway-China relations are very poor, nearly non-existent. There [has] been no contact since 2010. We must be prepared that if Norwegian authorities welcomed the Dalai Lama, it would be more difficult to normalize relations with China. We have to be honest about that.”
—Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende, 2014
To what extent is countercriticism coercion effective at silencing the targets, and why? China sanctioned Norway, Mongolia, and Australia for awarding human rights prizes to Chinese activists, hosting the Dalai Lama, and raising concerns about the origins of Covid-19. China’s sanctions have largely been ineffective at compelling the targets to withdraw their criticism and sometimes resulted in political realignment, economic diversification, or military balancing. The limited effectiveness of China’s countercriticism coercion against target states is consistent with previous research into sanctions that highlights how the actual imposition of sanctions often does not lead to concessions. This finding emphasizes the need to consider other possible audiences for China’s countercriticism coercion, such as third-party states.
Presented at ISA 2024
“China’s Reputation for Economic Coercion Deters Third-Party States from Criticism”
“The idea of Malaysia as a champion for Muslim minorities…is not consistently applied across the board. We talk about the Palestinians, the Rohingyas, the Bosnian Muslims in former Yugoslavia, but we don’t say anything about the Uyghurs. We have been very reticent to contradict China’s official explanation for what is happening in Xinjiang.”
—Member of Malaysian civil society, October 2022
How effective is China’s countercriticism coercion at deterring third-party states from criticizing China over human rights? I delve into Malaysia as a case study of a third-party state that has not been directly threatened or sanctioned by China. Malaysia refrained from publicly criticizing China over the situation in Xinjiang in 2019-22, while criticizing India, Israel, Myanmar, and the United States in the same time period and after criticizing China in 2009. China’s reputation for countercriticism coercion explains Malaysia’s silence. Malaysian policymakers interpreted news about China’s tacit sanctions as China’s punishment of criticism, believed that China could punish Malaysia over similar behavior, and deliberately refrained from criticism to avert retaliatory sanctions. Malaysia’s lack of criticism of China is not explained by China’s power, Malaysia’s economic dependence on China, rhetoric by China and China’s critics, domestic political incentives, or individual Malaysian leaders’ characteristics.
Presented at Frontiers of Empirical Research in East Asia (New York University) 2023 and APSA 2023
“Potential Economic Gains Increase Effectiveness of Coercion among Third-Party States”
Levels of Criticism and Support for China over the Situation in Xinjiang at the United Nations, 2019-22
After observing countercriticism coercion by China, which third-party states are deterred from criticizing China and why? To measure the extent to which states were deterred from criticizing China, I compare UN member states’ positions on the situation in Xinjiang from 2019-22 to their criticism of China in 2009 and other states from 2017-22. I theorize that states with higher potential economic gains from China are more likely to be deterred from criticizing China than states with lower potential economic gains or higher current economic dependence on China. Given China’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, I measure potential gains in 2019-22 based on states’ infrastructure deficits. States with greater potential gains from China were less likely to criticize China in 2019-22 in comparison to most baselines. Economic coercion can be effective at influencing third-party states, even when failing to change the behavior of targets. In contrast to the traditional focus on economic dependence, potential gains significantly influence third-party states’ reactions to coercion.
Presented at New Wave Realism (Ohio State University) 2023 and APSA 2023
Other Research
Working Papers
“Regime-Dependent Economic Interests and China’s Stance on Humanitarian Intervention.” Presented at Junior Scholars Symposium 2020.
“Peer Pressure: Interstate Criticism and Human Rights Treaty Ratification” with Lisa Fan. Presented at MPSA 2023 and ISA 2024.
Works in Progress
“South Korean Refugee Policies and the UN Refugee Convention.”
“Praising and Shaming by International Organizations” with Lisa Fan.